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Thought experiments and experimental ethics
Thomas Pölzler and Norbert Paulo
Department of Philosophy, University of Graz, Graz, Austria
ABSTRACT
Experimental ethicists investigate traditional ethical questions with non-
traditional means, namely with the methods of the empirical sciences.
Studies in this area have made heavy use of philosophical thought
experiments such as the well-known trolley cases. Yet, the specific function of
these thought experiments within experimental ethics has received little
consideration. In this paper we attempt to fill this gap. We begin by
describing the function of ethical thought experiments, and show that these
thought experiments should not only be classified according to their function
but also according to their scope. On this basis we highlight several ways
in which the use of thought experiments in experimental ethics can be
philosophically relevant. We conclude by arguing that experimental
philosophy currently only focuses on a small subcategory of ethical thought
experiments and suggest a broadening of its research agenda.
KEYWORDS Thought experiments; experimental philosophy; experimental ethics; veil of ignorance;
trolley cases
Introduction
Experimental philosophy is a relatively new approach to philosophy. Exper-
imental philosophers investigate traditional philosophical questions with
non-traditional means, namely with the methods of the empirical sciences
(Knobe and Nichols 2008; 2014; 2017). Althoughmost work in experimental
philosophy has been done in the realm of theoretical philosophy, it has also
been applied to ethics, broadly conceived (on experimental ethics see
Appiah 2009; Mikhail 2011; Greene 2013; Christen et al. 2014; Lütge,
Rusch, and Uhl 2014; Liao 2016; Pölzler 2018; Paulo and Bublitz 2020).
Experimental ethics, as we use this term, covers experimental
approaches that intend to inform first-order moral questions. In addition,
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significant parts of experimental ethics are also devoted to issues in moral
epistemology, primarily concerning the (un)reliability of moral intuitions
(for an overview see Machery 2017, chap. 2). A number of studies have
been claimed to suggest that moral intuitions may be sensitive to vari-
ations in the presentation of moral scenarios. For example, Lanteri,
Chelini, and Rizzello (2008), Wiegmann, Okan, and Nagel (2012) and
Liao et al. (2012) found a number of order effects, with moderate to
large effect sizes, primarily for trolley scenarios. Responses to such scen-
arios have also been found to be influenced by the way in which infor-
mation is framed (Petrinovich and O’Neill 1996) and by incidental
emotions such as happiness (e.g. Valdesolo and DeSteno 2006; but see
Ghelfi et al. 2020; Johnson, Cheung, and Donnellan 2014). In addition,
sometimes moral intuitions seem to vary with demographic factors
such as gender, age, culture, socio-economic status and personality as
well (but see Knobe, forthcoming). For example, Petrinovich, O’Neill,
and Jorgensen (1993) and Zamzow and Nichols (2009) report gender
differences in response to trolley cases. Fumagalli et al. (2010) and
Bartels and Pizarro (2011) found that men tend more towards ‘character-
istically’ utilitarian intuitions, i.e. intuitions that are easier explained by
reference to utilitarianism than by reference to alternative moral theories.
Also, Ahlenius and Tännsjö (2012) report that Americans, Russians and
Chinese test subjects respond systematically differently to variants of
the trolley cases. Gold, Colman, and Pulford (2014) report similar effects
for British as compared to Chinese test subjects.
As these examples illustrate, experimental ethics makes heavy use of
traditional philosophical thought experiments such as the well-known
trolley cases.1 This is not exactly news. What is far less clear, though, is
how experimental ethicists use these traditional philosophical thought
experiments. The most influential responses to the so-called paradox of
thought experiments – that they ‘often have novel empirical import
even though they are conducted entirely inside one’s head’ (Horowitz
and Massey 1991, 1) – reconstruct thought experiments either as a
priori insights into Platonist laws of nature (Brown 1991) or as mere argu-
ments (Norton 1996). In contrast, experimental ethics is, by definition,
empirical in nature. Two thematically pertinent papers – both titled
1There are different versions of the trolley cases. One version is bystander: A runaway trolley heads
towards five workers. If nobody interferes it will kill them. Would it to be appropriate to divert the
trolley onto a different set of tracks where there is only one worker? In the footbridge version, one
can only save the five railroad workers by pushing a large man off a footbridge onto the tracks.
(Foot 2003; Thomson 1976)
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‘Thought Experiments and Experimental Philosophy’ (Horvath 2015;
Ludwig 2017) – emphasise the fact that experimental philosophers
make use of traditional philosophical thought experiments, but none dis-
cusses how they use them. In this paper our aim is to tackle this
desideratum.
We will begin by describing the function of ethical thought exper-
iments (Sec. 2), and show that these thought experiments should not
only be classified according to their function but also according to their
scope (Sec. 3). On this basis we will highlight several ways in which the
use of thought experiments in experimental ethics can be philosophically
relevant (Sec. 4). We conclude by arguing that experimental philosophy
currently only focuses on a small subcategory of ethical thought exper-
iments and suggest a significant broadening of its research agenda
(Sec. 5).
Functions of ethical thought experiments
The use of thought experiments in ethics is partly similar to the use of
thought experiments in the sciences. As in the sciences (Sorensen 1992,
191), an actual execution of thought experiments is often impossible in
ethics – just think of far-fetched scenarios such as the footbridge
version of the trolley cases or Thomson’s violinist.2 Other ethical
thought experiments could well be carried out. This holds, for example,
for ticking-bomb3 or plank-of-Carneades4 scenarios. But, of course, the
execution of these thought experiments would often be morally ques-
tionable, to say the least.
That said, it is neither the (im)possibility to actually run thought exper-
iments nor the research ethical problems of running them that motivates
the use of thought experiments in ethics. Other than scientists, ethicists
use thought experiments instead of actual experiments because the
execution of the experiments wouldn’t give them the philosophically
2Violinist: While you were asleep, and without any prior consent, your body has been hooked up to the
body of a celebrity violinist with a particular medical condition. This condition requires her to be con-
nected to your metabolic system for nine months; otherwise she will die. The question is whether it is
morally permissible for you to demand to be separated from the violinist. (Thomson 1971)
3Ticking bomb: Imagine that the only way to save thousands of lives from the explosion of a ticking time
bomb is to torture the suspected terrorist so that he reveals where the bomb is hidden. Would torture
be permissible in such circumstances? (Shue 1978; Allhoff 2012)
4The plank-of-Carneades scenario goes back to Carneades of Cyrene (2nd century BC): Two shipwrecked
sailors see a plank that can only carry one of them. One of them reaches the plank first; when the other
sailor also reaches the plank, he is about to drown. He pushes the first sailor off the plank, thus causing
him to drown. Is the surviving sailor to blame or did he merely act in self-defense? For a similar scenario
see (Fuller 1949).
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relevant information they seek when running the thought experiment.
For example, how the different actions possible in trolley scenarios are
to be judged morally simply wouldn’t follow from how people actually
act in these scenarios (at least not in any straightforward way). For
example, even if a large majority of persons refrained from pushing the
large man off the bridge it could still be the case that doing so was
morally required. Just as in the sciences, thought experiments in ethics
are meant to work through mere reflection (Häggqvist 1996; Gendler
2000). Other than in the sciences, however, the lack of actual execution
of these experiments is not an epistemic deficit.
But if this is correct, what is the function of thought experiments in
ethics, i.e. why do ethicists use thought experiments? Here we distinguish
between three mains functions: (1) epistemic, (2) illustrative, and (3) heur-
istic. This distinction is somewhat artificial, and in some cases it will be
difficult to draw the boundaries between the three functions. It must
also be noted that one and the same thought experiment can be used
in epistemic as well as illustrative and heuristic ways (see, e.g. trolley).
Yet, it has still proven to be helpful to categorise the functions of
thought experiments in this way, or in very similar ways (see, e.g. Brun
2017; Walsh 2011).
The epistemic function
The epistemic function describes the goal of changing or affirming beliefs.
More specifically, the imagination of the execution of an epistemic
thought experiment is expected to provide reasons for or against a
moral statement, principle or theory. When used negatively, epistemic
thought experiments are used as counter-examples or refuters (Sorensen
1992, 153; Gähde 2000). This use follows a rather ‘scientific’ understanding
of how moral philosophy works, namely by falsifying natural law-like
moral principles. The basic idea is that moral principles hold universally
or necessarily. That is, whenever the principle applies to a situation, it dic-
tates a certain moral judgment. Every successful counter-example is
regarded as evidence against the validity of the principle. Thus, for
example, if the trolley cases are successful counter-examples to the doc-
trine of double effect, this undermines the doctrine (see, e.g. Kung
2016, 229; Elster 2011, 242; Walsh 2011, 471).5
5Note that some philosophers and psychologists have argued that versions of the trolley cases (particu-
larly bystander vs. footbridge) support (rather than undermine) the doctrine of double effect (e.g., Foot
1967; Mikhail 2011).
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When epistemic thought experiments are used positively, the basic
idea is that particular cases elicit moral intuitions, and that these intuitions
provide defeasible reasons to believe in their content. Ethicists often seek
to justify moral principles by reference to such intuitions about cases.6 For
example, thinking about Thomson’s violinist can be supposed to yield
reasons that abortion can be morally permissible even if the fetus is
granted a right to life. Such intuitions about particular cases can then
be used to theorise about morality. Proponents of Rawlsian reflective equi-
librium, for example, search for moral principles that cohere with the
content of intuitions about cases (Cath 2016); others largely disregard
moral principles and theorise about morality through moral consistency
reasoning on the level of cases (Campbell and Kumar 2012); still others
work primarily with cases but also ultimately aim at moral principles
(most prominently Kamm 1992, 6–11, 2011).
The illustrative function
Although the change or affirmation of beliefs is often regarded as the
most important function of ethical thought experiments, the illustrative
and heuristic functions are also very common. In ethics, illustrative
thought experiments are supposed to make a statement, a principle or
a theory more comprehensible, i.e. to facilitate our understanding of it.
It is in this sense that Peter Singer, for example, developed his well-
known pond thought experiment: It is obvious that everyone has a duty
to rescue a child who is in danger of drowning in a pond if this is possible
without considerable personal danger. This is in fact so obvious that
Singer can contrast this duty to rescue with a less obvious duty, namely
to help children in danger of starving to death in the developing word,
even though this would cost part of the disposable income of the inhabi-
tants of the developed world. This comparison of two scenarios is not
itself intended to provide a reason to donate money. Rather, it is intended
to illustrate Singer’s utilitarianism, which in turn provides reasons for
donating money (Singer 1972, 231).
The heuristic function
Unlike the epistemic and the illustrative, the heuristic function of ethical
thought experiments is open-ended. When thought experiments are used
6Some philosophers claim that this picture of how philosophy works is wrong, e.g., Cappelen 2012;
Deutsch 2015.
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heuristically, they are not intended to provide reasons for or against a theory
or to illustrate it. Rather, they are supposed to help to generate new hypoth-
eses about, or to get a better understanding of, the implications or differ-
ences between moral statements, principles or theories. As any reader of
Judith Thomson or Frances Kamm knows, the trolley cases, for example,
have not only been used epistemically, but also to test certain formulations
of principles or to encounter previously unnoticed factors that could prove
morally relevant. For this purpose, countless variations of the cases have
been created and intuitive reactions to them have been tested. Kamm, for
example, often uses thought experiments to invite her readers to explore
difficult moral matters with her. Along the way she urges the reader to
remain open-minded, to not settle on certain responses to cases or on
moral principles too easily. In other words, she asks the reader to follow
the cases wherever they lead (Kamm 2007, 5).
It will sometimes be hard to find a clear-cut distinction between the
heuristic and the epistemic use of thought experiments. In general, the
main difference is that the former does not have a clear argumentative
goal, whereas the latter does. Published philosophical writing rarely fea-
tures the open-ended search for truth that is characteristic for the heuris-
tic use of thought experiments. That is, we rarely read about how the
authors actually came to hold their conclusions. Rather, philosophical
papers and books are usually written with the goal of convincing the
readers of a particular view. This might lead to an underestimation of
the importance of the role of heuristic thought experiments in philosophi-
cal practice. When philosophers think about moral matters, when they
discuss them in classrooms or at conferences, oftentimes they do not
already have a clear argumentative goal. They simply want to explore
the issues by pondering their intuitions about a variety of cases, or so
we would argue. Of course, the heuristic use can lead to firm beliefs
that are then effectively supported by epistemic thought experiments.
These might be the very same thought experiments that, when used
heuristically, ultimately convinced the philosopher of their moral beliefs.
Scope of ethical thought experiments
All ethical thought experiments mentioned so far aim at a certain state-
ment, a certain principle or a certain theory and attempt to confirm or
undermine, illustrate or increase our understanding of it (depending on
their function). For example, Singer’s pond thought experiment is
intended to illustrate utilitarianism. It can hardly be used to motivate
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other moral theories. Similarly, Thomson’s violinist can hardly be used to
support a position in the ethics of migration.
There is, however, a kind of ethical thought experiments, which, to our
knowledge, has no equivalent in either the natural sciences or theoretical
philosophy. These thought experiments can be used with regard to a
variety of statements, principles or theories. Although they have the
same functions as other ethical thought experiments – i.e. they can be
used epistemically, illustratively and heuristically – their scope of appli-
cation is much wider. Probably the best-known ethical thought exper-
iment of this kind is the Rawlsian veil of ignorance.7 Closely related to
this is the idea of an impartial spectator8, as it has been discussed in
moral philosophy at least since David Hume and Adam Smith (see, e.g.
Raphael 2007; Korsgaard 2008; Gordon 1995).
Thought experiments of this kind were originally developed against a
certain theoretical background and thus had very specific functions
within the theories defended by Rawls, Hume and Smith. This is why
Brun, for example, does not assign the veil to any of the three functions
mentioned earlier, but introduces a fourth (not further explained
‘theory immanent’) function (2017, 201; see also Cohnitz 2005, 146).
However, instead of creating special functions for individual thought
experiments, we suggest sticking to the three functions explained
above and distinguishing this type of ethical thought experiment from
other types by its wide scope of application.
One may doubt whether this works for our prime example, i.e. the veil.
After all, John Rawls probably wanted to use this thought experiment for
the specific purpose of illustrating his abstract arguments for certain prin-
ciples of distributive justice (he characterised it as a ‘device of represen-
tation’, Rawls 2001, 17). But even if this interpretation of Rawls is
correct this does not undermine our point that the veil is also used for
other functions. What we refer to as the ’idea of the veil’ has long eman-
cipated itself from Rawls’ original use.9 Today this idea of the veil is applied
to all sorts of questions in ethics and political philosophy, almost always
with epistemic aims (just see these examples from the ethics of migration
7The general idea of veil is this: One is asked to think about matters of justice and morality from a pos-
ition in which one is veiled from knowledge about one’s place in society, status, abilities etc.
8Impartial spectator: What is morally right depends on what an impartial, omniscient ideal observer
would approve of.
9In Rawls’ work, the veil is placed in the context of the original position, which adds requirements of
rationality (see Harsanyi 1975; Gaus and Thrasher 2016). Also, often only a very ‘thin’ veil is used.
That is, one is required to imagine not to know one’s place in society (e.g., one’s gender, abilities, eth-
nicity, wealth, etc.), whereas the veil is clearly “thicker” in Rawls’ theory, where it also requires abstrac-
tion from certain societies.
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and from health care ethics: Carens 1987, 257; Harris 1987; Singer et al.
1995). In the general literature on thought experiments the veil is thus
typically ascribed an epistemic (Gähde 2000; Miščević 2017; Celikates
2012), and sometimes also a heuristic function (Gendler 2011, 132; Celi-
kates 2012). This in fact supports our view that wide-scope thought exper-
iments generally have the same functions as the ethical thought
experiments that are aimed at a specific normative statement, principle
or theory (‘narrow’ scope thought experiments). So, there is no need to
assume a further distinct function.
What is special about the veil, the impartial spectator, and other
thought experiments of this kind is, as we said, that they can be
applied to a variety of issues. They can be used epistemically, illustratively
or heuristically for moral matters on all levels of abstraction. They typically
fulfil these functions by inviting the reader to take up a certain perspec-
tive. In particular, they are designed to help people to take what has been
called the ‘moral point of view’ (Baier 1958). The veil and the impartial
spectator do so by describing situations the conditions of which are
intended to ensure impartiality (Paulo and Pölzler 2020; Jollimore 2018);
other wide-scope thought experiments (such as Sidgwick’s point of view
of the universe or Habermas’ ideal discourse) seem to approximate the
moral point of view by other means. In any case, from the moral point
of view, all possible statements, principles and theories can be explored
epistemically, illustratively or heuristically. One can use wide-scope
thought experiments such as the veil to underpin principles of distributive
justice; but one can also use them to undermine or motivate certain pos-
itions in migration ethics and health care ethics (see references above); or
about animal ethics (Liberto 2017; Rowlands 2009), abortion (Berry 2016;
Dreier 2017; Williams 2015), global justice (Beitz 1999; Brock 2005; Pogge
1988), intergenerational justice (Reiman 2007; Wolf and Dron 2015), and
the basic social minimum (Copp 1998; Waldron 1986). It is in this sense
that thought experiments of this kind have a wider scope than other
ethical thought experiments.
One might object that narrow scope thought experiments such as
trolley or violinist do, in fact, apply more broadly than we claim. This objec-
tion appears particularly pressing with regard to trolley-style moral dilem-
mas. For example, these dilemmas have been used to pit deontology
against consequentialism, to illuminate or criticise the doctrine of
double effect, the difference between act and omission, etc. They can
also involve self-driving cars, hijacked planes, etc. instead of trolleys.
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However, this description is misleading. First, deontology/consequen-
tialism, act/omission, and the correctness of the doctrine of double
effect are, in fact, largely intertwined problems. A consequentialist
response to the trolley problem will most likely not be explained by dis-
tinguishing between act and omission or between intending and merely
foreseeing, but a deontological response likely will be explained in such a
way. In other words, the different headlines might give way to the
assumption that they address distinct problems, when, in fact, the pro-
blems are closely related.
Second, the different subject matters of trolley cases – trains, cars,
planes, etc. – might be taken to suggest that trolley cases apply to a
wide range of different philosophical problems. This, again, is a misunder-
standing. The different forms really are just different masks for the same
structure, which is recognised in labels such as ‘Trolleyology’ (Sauer 2018,
chap. 6) or ‘moral emergencies’ (Appiah 2009, 96). They are scenarios that
feature forced life and death choices with fixed outcomes. The number of
philosophical problems that can be captured by such a structure is
limited. ‘Trolleyological’ or ‘moral emergency’ thought experiments can
be used to make the same points in different philosophical debates (be
it self-driving cars or terrorist attacks). But these points are always
about forced life and death choices with fixed outcomes, meant to high-
light the complex of intertwined problems just mentioned: deontology/
consequentialism, act/omission, and the doctrine of double effect.
It is true that trolley cases have somewhat wider scope of application
than violinist, pond and other traditional ethical thought experiments. Trol-
leyology can be used to test certain distinctions in a variety of moral prin-
ciples that postulate morally relevant differences between certain kinds of
acts. However, again, these tests will always be limited to the consider-
ations mentioned above: deontology/consequentialism, act/omission,
and the doctrine of double effect. In that sense, trolley cases are narrow-
scope thought experiments. They cannot be used to understand or illumi-
natemany other issues in ethics, especially in applied ethics and in political
philosophy. For example, trolleyology doesn’t apply to most aspects of
animal ethics; neither does it apply to questions of political equality.
To sum up, there are at least two types of ethical thought experiments:
those with a narrow scope (such as trolley or violinist) and those with a
wide scope (such as veil or impartial spectator). These thought exper-
iments can have the same three functions, i.e. they can be used epistemi-
cally, illustratively or heuristically. With this understanding in mind, let us
now return to the question of how experimental philosophy relates to
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ethical thought experiments. In the next section, we will explain how
experimental ethicists have actually used ethical thought experiments.
Then we will provide some suggestions for future research.
Thought experiments in experimental ethics
Some empirical investigations of ethical thought experiments have focused
on how participants actually behave or decide in response to these thought
experiments. For example, moral psychologists have used virtual reality
technologies to investigate how test subjects react in the trolley cases (Skul-
mowski et al. 2014; Sütfeld et al. 2017; Francis et al. 2016, 2017). Such studies
are highly interesting, and sometimes even normatively relevant (Paulo and
Pölzler 2020). However, many of them do not fall within the scope of exper-
imental ethics, as it is understood here, because they are not primarily
intended to contributing to answer philosophical questions (recall that on
our understanding experimental ethics requires such a philosophical
intention).
Most experimental ethics research so far has not focused on how
participants behave or decide in response to thought experiments; it
has rather explored their moral intuitions, i.e. the ‘strong immediate
moral beliefs’ (Sinnott-Armstrong 2008, 47) that are prompted by con-
sidering cases like trolley, violinist, etc. Studies have in particular been
conducted on three aspects of these intuitions (mirroring research in
experimental philosophy in general; see Knobe and Nichols 2017): (1)
the intuitions’ content, (2) their sensitivity to irrelevant factors, and
(3) their diversity.
Content-focused investigations
Philosophers often refer directly to their moral intuitions. They do so
under the assumption that these intuitions are shared by most people
or a certain subset of people (e.g. Jackson 1998; Kauppinen 2007); or at
least by most philosophers or a certain subset of philosophers. For
example, when Thomson or Kamm report their intuitions on trolley
cases they seem to assume that it is not just them who have these intui-
tions but at least some of their readers as well. This is not to ignore that
philosophers sometimes state that they only intend to explore their own
intuitions.10 Take Kamm, for instance, who says that ‘that much more is
10We thank a reviewer for this journal for pressing us on this point.
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accomplished when one person considers her judgments and then tries
to analyse and justify their grounds than if we do mere surveys.’ (Kamm
2007, 5) However, in a footnote she explains that certain case intuitions
are ‘a natural source of data from which we can isolate the reasons and
principles underlying their responses.’ That is,
the responses come from and reveal some underlying psychologically real
structure, a structure that was always (unconsciously) part of the thought pro-
cesses of some people. Such people embody the reasoning and principles […]
that generates these responses. The point is to make the reasons and principles
explicit. […] If the same ‘deep structure’ is present in all persons—and there is
growing psychological evidence that this is true […]—this would be another
reason why considering the intuitive judgements of one person would be
sufficient, for each person would give the same response. (Kamm 2007, 8,
note 4; for more details see her 1992, 6–11)
So, Kamm thinks that it suffices to engage with one’s own intuitions if
and only if one is among the ‘few people […] able to respond to a
complex case with a firm response.’ (Kamm 1992, 9) For these people
are the ‘natural source of data’ and, after careful thinking, have conver-
ging intuitions. Moreover, the whole method of cases seems to presup-
pose that the author assumes that her intuitions are widely shared. If
these philosophers did not think that their intuitions are at least some-
what similar to those of others, then why would they write books and
articles that are grounded in them? Why would they expect anybody
to be interested in reading these books and articles? Hence, one func-
tion of experimental ethics has been to test whether philosophers’
assumptions about the moral intuitions of (some) people or (some)
philosophers are correct.
Testing ethicists’ assumptions about the representativeness of their
intuitions about thought experiments is a philosophically important
task. For example, if it turned out that most or certain subsets of ordinary
speakers or philosophers did not share Thomson’s and Kamm’s intuitions
this would, at least under certain circumstances, weaken these intuitions’
evidentiary force. It is accordingly no wonder that experimental ethicists
regularly investigate the content of people’s intuitions about thought
experiments, such as the content of their intuitions about trolley cases
(see, e.g. Greene et al. 2001; Liao et al. 2012). Yet, most often they don’t
leave it at that. In addition, and in fact primarily, experimental ethicists




The lion’s share of research in experimental ethics has so far targeted the
factors that people’s intuitions about ethical thought experiments are
sensitive to. Do these intuitions respond to features that can plausibly
be deemed morally relevant? Or are they (also) caused by (purportedly)
irrelevant factors?
In the introduction to this paper we already provided a number of
examples for sensitivity-focused studies (see Machery 2017, chap. 2, for
a helpful overview; and Knobe forthcoming for a recent defense of the
stability of philosophical intuitions). For example, several studies have
been claimed to suggest that participants’ intuitions are influenced by
the way in which information is framed (e.g. as saving four persons
versus killing one person in trolley cases, e.g. Petrinovich and O’Neill
1996), by the order in which scenarios are presented (e.g. if the bystander
version of trolley dilemmas is presented prior to the footbridge version,
rather than subsequently, participants tend to respond differently, e.g.
Lanteri, Chelini, and Rizzello 2008; Wiegmann, Okan, and Nagel 2012
and Liao et al. 2012) or by incidental emotions such as anger, happiness,
mirth and elevation (participants who were primed with these emotions
tended to make different judgments than participants who were not
primed in this way; see e.g. Seidel and Prinz 2013; Strohminger, Lewis,
and Meyer 2011; Valdesolo and DeSteno 2006).11
By attempting to establish such sensitivities to irrelevant factors most
experimental ethicists have attempted to undermine particular moral
statements, principles or theories (and hence to support their alterna-
tives). The most famous example is arguably provided by Joshua
Greene. Greene et al. (2001) used fMRI to investigate participants’ brain
activity while they were thinking about trolley cases. In his interpretation
this study showed that ‘[t]here are good reasons to think that our distinc-
tively deontological moral intuitions… reflect the influence of morally
irrelevant factors and are therefore unlikely to track the moral truth’
(Greene 2008, 69 f.). Therefore, as deontology is debunked, we ought to
11Note that studies on incidental emotions were not designed to directly answer philosophical questions
but as investigations into classical moral psychology. Moreover, most of the extant research in this area
has focused on the emotion of disgust (e.g., Schnall et al. 2008; Schnall, Benton, and Harvey 2008).
Some of these disgust-focused studies did not replicate (e.g., Ghelfi et al. 2020; Johnson, Cheung,
and Donnellan 2014), and meta-analyses suggest that disgust either does not have any or only a
very small effect on moral judgements (e.g., Landy and Goodwin 2015). In fact, even the effect of
other incidental emotions on moral judgments has typically been small and many studies have also
been subject to methodological worries (Pölzler 2018).
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go with consequentialism (on this argument see Paulo 2018; for critique
see Berker 2009; Kahane 2015).
However, sensitivity-focused research may be employed for broader
methodological purposes as well. In line with what has been called the
‘negative program’ of experimental philosophy12, it may be argued that
moral intuitions are so easily distorted by irrelevant factors that ethicists
should give up the practice of relying on these intuitions at all. On this
view, all intuition-based arguments – whether they attempt to support
deontology or consequentialism, or any other moral statement, principle
of theory – must be dismissed (e.g. Paulo 2020; Peter Singer 2005).13
Diversity-focused investigations
Some empirical research on morality has also focused on variations in
people’s intuitions regarding thought experiments, such as variations
with culture, gender, age, socio-economic status or personality (see
again Machery 2017, chap. 2, for a helpful overview; and Knobe forthcom-
ing for a recent defense of the stability of philosophical intuitions). Again,
representative studies have already been mentioned in the introduction,
suggesting that responses to trolley cases vary both with gender (Bartels
and Pizarro 2011; Fumagalli et al. 2010; Petrinovich, O’Neill, and Jorgen-
sen 1993; Zamzow and Nichols 2009) and culture (Ahlenius and Tännsjö
2012; Gold, Colman, and Pulford 2014).14
Some studies have also involved alternative ethical thought experiments.
For example, a study by Abarbanell and Hauser (2010) suggests that in con-
trast to Westerners, rural Mayans do not judge harmful actions (e.g. saving
five lives at the expense of one by asking a man to cross the road in front
of an oncoming truck) to be more wrong than equally harmful omissions
(e.g. saving the five lives by not warning a man who is about to cross the
road)15; and in their famous ‘Moral Machine’ study Awad et al. (2018) asked
participants from all around the world to respond to thought experiments
12According to a common distinction, experimental philosophy studies are conducted to either support
substantive philosophical theses (this is its ‘positive program’) and to undermine traditional philoso-
phical methods, especially appeals to intuitions (‘negative program’) (Knobe and Nichols 2017).
13In response to sensitivity-based arguments some critics of experimental philosophy have claimed that
only the intuitions of philosophers, and not of lay people, matter for ethics and philosophy. This claim
will be discussed in Section 5.
14Note that some of the studies that reported gender differences in people’s intuitions about trolley
cases did not replicate, see Adleberg, Thompson and Nahmias 2015.
15One set of Abarbanell and Hauser’s thought experiments involved five men on a road. The lives of
these men are saved from an oncoming truck by sacrificing the life of one man. In the first version
of the vignette this is achieved by asking the man to cross the road (ACTION). In the second
version, in contrast, the man is not warned of the oncoming truck (OMISSION). Abarbanell and
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that involve deadly accidents with self-driving cars, reporting significant
differences between (1) North America and many European countries, (2)
Eastern Countries, and (3) Latin America and countries with French
influence.16
Sometimes diversity-focused investigations on ethical thought exper-
iments have been motivated by (partly) non-philosophical reasons (as
may be the case with regard to both Abarbanell and Hauser 2010;
Awad et al. 2018). Recently, however, their philosophical relevance has
been considered in more detail as well. One potential implication of
moral intuitions’ variation across populations is again that either particu-
lar moral intuitions or these intuitions in general fail to be reliable guides
to the moral truth – as has been argued with regard to other philosophical
concepts, such as knowledge (Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich 2001; but see
Machery et al. 2017) or reference (Machery et al. 2004). Moreover, some
experimental ethicists have appealed to this variation in metaphysical
and semantic arguments, arguing that it supports a particular (relativistic)
interpretation of moral truth (e.g. Doris and Plakias 2008; Fraser and
Hauser 2010).
Suggestions for future research
In the last section, we explained three main ways in which thought exper-
iments have so far been used in experimental ethics: (1) content-focused,
(2) sensitivity-focused and (3) diversity-focused. Investigations of these
kinds can shed light on which moral intuitions about particular thought
experiments particular people have, and why. In order for these results
to bear on moral statements, principles or theories, however, additional
philosophical arguments are required. For example, why believe that
emotions are unreliable in bringing about moral judgements or that a
certain amount of diversity undermines our moral intuitions?
In what follows we will abstract from these more fundamental philoso-
phical issues (see, e.g. Berker 2009; Heinzelmann 2018; Kauppinen 2007;
Nadelhoffer and Nahmias 2007); our focus will rather be on the ways in
Hauser report that rural Mayan subjects did not judge the actions they were presented with to be less
permissible than their corresponding omissions.
16The most important differences across these clusters concern the weight that subjects attributed to
moral preferences. First, subjects from the Eastern cluster attributed much less weight to sparing
younger than older people than subjects from the other clusters. Second subjects from the Eastern
cluster also attributed much less weight to sparing high status people. And third, subjects from the
Southern cluster attributed much less weight to sparing humans rather than pets, and much more
weight to sparing women and fit persons.
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which experimental ethicists have used thought experiments. In particu-
lar, we attempt to advance this area of research by suggesting that it
should incorporate five additional kinds of investigations (that have so
far received less attention): investigations into (1) illustrative and heuristic
thought experiments, (2) wide-scope thought experiments, (3) de-biasing
strategies, (4) atypical thought experiments, and (5) philosophers’ intui-
tions about thought experiments.
Illustrative and heuristic thought experiments
So far experimental ethics has focused almost exclusively on the episte-
mic function of ethical thought experiments. This is again most obvious
in the case of Greene’s attempts to justify consequentialism (Greene
2008); but it is also true of all the other studies in experimental ethics
mentioned above (e.g. Liao et al. 2012; Wiegmann, Okan, and Nagel
2012).17 Irrespectively of whether these studies have focused on the
content, the sensitivity or the diversity of test persons’ intuitions, their
underlying philosophical aim has always been to support or undermine
our justification for holding certain ethical statements, principles or
theories.
However, experimental ethics could also provide valuable insights into
the appropriateness of illustrative and heuristic usages of thought exper-
iments, by testing whether these thought experiments really fulfil the
function that they have been claimed to fulfil. There are many ways in
which this might be done. As an example, consider Singer’s pond. This
thought experiment is assumed to be a good illustration of utilitarian
arguments about our obligations to the global poor. If this assumption
is correct then a group of participants who are presented with pond
and a group of participants who are presented with these abstract utilitar-
ian arguments should mostly end up endorsing the same moral state-
ments about our obligations to the global poor (in the absence of any
plausible alternative explanations for divergence). The thought exper-
iment could only be considered illustratively effective in case of this
result; otherwise it would be ineffective.
As was pointed out in Section 2, ethical thought experiments are quite
often used for illustrative or heuristic purposes. We therefore suggest that
17To further clarify, even though some philosophers have used trolley in heuristic ways and pond in
illustrative ways (Sec. 2), empirical studies have so far exclusively tested these thought experiments’
epistemic function.
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future research in experimental ethics accounts for this fact, and also puts
these alternative functions to the test.
Wide-scope thought experiments
So far experimental ethics has also almost exclusively been oriented
towards thought experiments with a narrow field of application. For
example, as we have seen, there are numerous studies on trolley (which
pits deontology against consequentialism; e.g. Greene et al. 2001;
Huang, Greene, and Bazerman 2019; Liao et al. 2012; Valdesolo and
DeSteno 2006) and similar scenarios (which were used to investigate
intuitions about the ethics of self-driving cars, the moral significance of
the action/omission distinction and other specific statements, principles
or theories, e.g. Abarbanell and Hauser 2010; Awad et al. 2018). This
focus falls short of representing the full range of thought experiments
in ethics. Above we argued that some of the thought experiments that
are most often used by ethicists (such as the veil or the impartial spectator)
rather have a wide scope, i.e. they can be applied to a variety of different
ethical statements, principles or theories.
Experimental ethics could provide helpful information about the kinds
of moral statements, principles and theories that people endorse in the
face of wide-scope thought experiments. For example, situated behind
the ‘veil of ignorance’, would people really prefer Rawls’ principles of
justice over utilitarianism (see Bruner 2018; Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and
Eavey 1987; Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1993 for investigations from the
perspective of experimental economics)? Even more importantly, empiri-
cal studies on wide-scope thought experiments could also illuminate the
appropriateness of these thought experiments (e.g. Paulo and Pölzler
2020). They could investigate how effective wide-scope thought exper-
iments are in achieving their aim (i.e. in leading people to adopt the
‘moral point of view’ for purposes of justification, illustration or heuristics);
they could investigate how sensitive these thought experiments are to
irrelevant factors such as the order or framing of certain information;
and they could investigate to what extent the thought experiments’ effec-
tiveness and results differ across different populations.18
18There have already been some studies on wide-scope thought experiments‘ appropriateness. For
example, Aguiar, Becker, and Miller (2013) compared the veil’s effectiveness to the effectiveness of
other wide-scope thought experiments; and Bond and Park (1991) and Chan (2005) conducted
cross-cultural research on the veil. However, in Paulo and Pölzler (2020) we show that such studies
—even though they are fascinating—typically do not yield the kind of data that would be necessary
to form reliable judgments about wide-scope thought experiments’ appropriateness.
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Elsewhere (Paulo and Pölzler 2020) we have made concrete sugges-
tions for how to test the appropriateness of the veil. For example, the
thought experiment’s epistemic function may be investigated by a
study that involves the following two conditions: (non-veiled) a condition
in which participants arrive at a moral judgment in an ordinary way;
(veiled) a condition in which participants are first asked to disregard
their gender, race, income, etc. People are generally rather partial in
making moral judgments (see, e.g. Bocian and Wojciszke 2014; DeScioli
et al. 2014). Thus, if it turned out that judgments in the veiled condition
do not statistically significantly differ from judgments in the non-veiled
condition, or that judgments in the veiled condition do not show lower
correlations to participants’ gender, race, income, etc., this would
suggest that the veil is ineffective as a method of justification. It would
likely fail to lead people towards a more impartial point of view.
De-biasing strategies
In the last section, we saw that much research in experimental ethics has
tested our moral intuitions’ sensitivity to irrelevant factors such as order,
framing or incidental emotions. This information has typically been used
in arguments that purport to undermine (particular) moral statements,
principles or theories (e.g. Greene 2008). However, experimental ethicists
could also take a more constructive, forward-looking approach and inves-
tigate to what extent and how ordinary people or philosophers may be
‘de-biased’ in their responses to ethical thought experiments, i.e.
enabled to overcome their moral intuitions’ sensitivity to irrelevant
factors.
Strategies that might mitigate the influence of irrelevant factors on
people’s reasoning have been explored in some non-moral contexts. Pre-
liminary evidence from these other areas of inquiry suggests that certain
strategies can indeed significantly reduce biases in several respects (Das-
gupta and Asgari 2004; Larrick 2008; Morewedge et al. 2015). From these
findings, as well as other psychological and philosophical considerations,
experimental ethicists may derive hypotheses about how to ‘de-bias’
responses to ethical thought experiments. For example, they might
want to test how increasing awareness through mindfulness meditation
affects participants’ ability to become aware of and counteract the
influence of incidental emotions on their moral judgments; or whether
exercises meant to increase cognitive reflection ability or explanations
of the nature and effects of biases have any such effect (for some initial
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theoretical considerations and suggestions on moral de-biasing see
Herman 2020).
Atypical thought experiments
Many thought experiments in ethics share a set of distinct features. For
example, according to Machery (2017), they are unusual (e.g. people
rarely find themselves in circumstances where they can save five lives
at the expense of one by pulling a switch or pushing a large man off a
bridge); they pull apart properties that are usually strongly associated
(e.g. by using violence we usually do more harm than good, instead of
vice versa); and they involve philosophically irrelevant information (e.g.
it might be claimed that the size of the man on the footbridge is irrelevant
or distracting).
Some researchers have suggested that such common features of
ethical thought experiments explain why people’s intuitions about
them are prone to being influenced by irrelevant factors (Bauman et al.
2014; Machery 2017). The features may also be blamed for (some)
people not having determinate or meaningful intuitions about particular
thought experiments at all (see, e.g. MacIntyre 1981 and Sandel 1998 on
the veil). We acknowledge that these explanations are controversial and
do not endorse them here (for responses see, e.g. Greene 2014; Schindler
and Saint-Germier 2020). However, suppose for the sake of argument that
they turn out to be correct. This would mean that, where possible, philo-
sophers better switch to ‘atypical’ thought experiments: thought exper-
iments that, for example, are usual, don’t pull strongly associated
properties apart, and don’t involve philosophically irrelevant information.
As an example of such a thought experiment, consider the following vign-
ette from (Schnall et al. 2008, 1107): ‘James is going to work and considers
whether to walk the 1½ miles or to drive in. He is feeling lazy and decides
to drive in. How moral or immoral do you, personally, find James’s
decision to be?’19
Experimental ethics has so far mostly investigated typical thought
experiments like trolley (e.g. again Greene et al. 2001; Liao et al. 2012; Val-
desolo and DeSteno 2006). Hence, another suggestion for future research
is to test to what extent and in what ways these thought experiments are
19We realise that in testing certain kinds of hypotheses it will be difficult or impossible to come up with
fully typical thought experiments like the one provided above. Yet, typicality admits of degrees, and it
will often be possible to design thought experiments in a somewhat more typical way (e.g., simply by
removing philosophically irrelevant information).
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indeed disturbing. This may be achieved by presenting participants with
atypical as well as typical thought experiments (for initial evidence see
Schindler and Saint-Germier 2020), measuring imaginative resistance
(Kim, Kneer, and Stuart 2018), requesting verbal explanations of answer
choices, and other measures (for theoretical discussions of realistic vs. fan-
ciful cases see Stoner and Swartwood 2017; Shue 2006).
Philosophers’ intuitions
Some readers may doubt that our last two suggestions are helpful or well-
grounded. Why attempt to limit irrelevant influences on thought exper-
iments (by using atypical versions or de-biasing people) when there is a
sub-population that is not prone to these influences in the first place,
namely (moral) philosophers? In fact, isn’t there a case to be made that,
given their greater expertise (as well as other facts about them and
their inquiries), only philosophers’ responses to thought experiments
matter for ethics and philosophy more generally, i.e. that direct scientific
investigations of the intuitions of lay people are simply philosophically
irrelevant? (Kauppinen 2007; 2018; Williamson 2008)
This argument reflects what has come to be known as the ‘expertise
objection’ against experimental philosophy (for discussion see, e.g.
Horvath 2010; Nado 2014; Egler and Ross 2018). It is unclear to what
extent this objection succeeds. Initial evidence from non-moral contexts
suggests that philosophers may in fact be similarly susceptible to order
effects, framing effects, etc. as lay people (e.g. Machery 2017; Schwitzge-
bel and Cushman 2012; Tobia, Buckwalter, and Stich 2013). These findings
have been mostly substantiated by a recent large-scale study on moral
intuitions in particular (Horvath and Wiegmann 2021). Finally, it may
also be doubted that there are good philosophical reasons for regarding
only philosophers’ intuition as relevant (e.g. Nadelhoffer and Nahmias
2007; Pölzler 2018; Sytsma and Livengood 2015).
Nonetheless, outside of experimental philosophy the expertise objec-
tion is still often held. We thus suggest that to further account for this
objection – as well as for the fact that some ethicists only mean their
moral intuitions to be representative of those of other philosophers,
see Section 4 – future research in experimental ethics should follow in
the footsteps of other experimental philosophy research (see, e.g. the
above references regarding philosophers’ expertise). It should not only
test the intuitions of lay people but also of philosophers (for some exper-
imental ethics studies whose samples have already included philosophers
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see Löhr 2019; Schwitzgebel and Rust 2013; for a helpful overview see
Wiegmann, Horvath, and Meyer 2020).
Conclusion
Experimental ethicists investigate traditional ethical questions with non-
traditional means, namely with the methods of the empirical sciences.
Studies in this area have made heavy use of philosophical thought exper-
iments such as the well-known trolley cases. Yet, for some reason, the
specific function of these thought experiments within experimental
ethics has received little consideration. In this paper we attempted to
fill this gap. First, we described the function of ethical thought exper-
iments, distinguishing between an epistemic, an illustrative and a heuris-
tic function. We also showed that ethical thought experiments should not
only be classified according to their function but also according to their
scope. Some ethical thought experiments (such as the veil) can be
applied to a variety of moral issues. On the basis of this understanding
of thought experiments we highlighted several ways in which the use
of thought experiments in experimental ethics can be philosophically rel-
evant. Such studies can in particular inform us about the content of the
intuitions that people have about ethical thought experiments, these
intuitions’ sensitivity to irrelevant factors, and their diversity. Finally, we
suggested that experimental ethics broadens its research agenda to
include investigations into illustrative and heuristic thought experiments,
wide-scope thought experiments, de-biasing strategies, atypical thought
experiments, and philosophers’ intuitions about thought experiments. In
any case, since experimental ethics heavily relies on thought experiments,
an increased theoretical engagement with their function and implications
is likely to benefit the field. It is our hope that this paper contributes to
promoting such an engagement.
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